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James Cameron*

Future Directions in International
Environmental Law: Precaution,
Integration and Non-state Actors

In this, the Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture for 1995, James Cameron
discusses three developments in international environmental law,-the principles of precaution and of integration and the roles of non-state actors. The
precautionary principle calls for regulatory intervention to prevent environmental
harm even though the risk of damage remains scientifically uncertain. A wide
consensus exists in favour of a precautionary approach to environmental management and state practice is sufficient to assert the principle has attained the
status of customary international law, but it remains controversial because it
demands changes in practice. The principle of integration takes a holistic
approach to regulation. It requires the integration of environmental considerations into all public policy decisions from the outset. It also demands the
integration of pollution prevention measures with pollution controls so as to
minimize environmental degradation. Application of this evolving principle will
place environmental policy on a more efficient and effective course. Large
numbers of non-state actors with varied environmental, scientific, legal, academic and corporate backgrounds now participate in international environmental
fora and thus pose a challenge to fundamental notions of state sovereignty. Yet
states have begun to use, even to depend upon, the expertise of non-state actors
in developing international environmental policy, so it has become essential
legally to recognise their roles and to develop workable mechanisms for their
participation. The author concludes the incorporation of these legal concepts
demonstrates the growing maturity of international environmental law.
Dans le cadre de la conf6rence comm6morative Horace E. Read de 1995, James
Cameron traite de trois d6veloppements en droit international de I'environnement:
les principes de precaution et d'int6gration, ainsi que les r6les des intervenants
non-gouvernementaux. Le principe de precaution requiert une r~glementation
visant a pr6venir les dommages i I'environnement, m6me dans les cas oi) les
risques demeurent scientifiquement incertains. II existe un consensus g6n6ral
qui s'exprime en faveur de I'approche de pr6caution dans la gestion de
I'environnement, et la pratique des Etats en est suffisamment rependue pour
6lever le principe au rang de regle de droit international coutumier. Toutefois, ce
principe demeure controvers6 puisqu'il exige des changements au niveau de la
pratique. Le principe d'int~gration adopte une approche globale face 6 la
r6glementation. II n6cessite I'int6grationde considerations environnementales 6
toutes les d6cisions affectant les politiques d'ordre public, et ce, des le debut des
discussions. IIexige 6galement l'int6gration de mesures pour la pr6vention et le
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contr6le de /a pollution de fagon a minimiser la dot6rioration de l'environnement.
L'application et I'6volution de ce principe rendra les politiques en matiore
d'environnement plus efficientes et plus efficaces. De nombreux intervenants
non-gouvernementaux provenant des milieux environnementaux, scientifiques,
juridiques, acadomiques et corporatifs participent maintenant aux difforents
forums internationaux en mati6re d'environnement, ce qui pose un defi au
concept fondamental de la souverainet6 des 6tats. Pourtant, les dtats ont
commenc6 utiliser, et m6me a s'appuyersur I'expertise de ces agents nongouvernementaux dans I'6laboration de politiques environnementales
internationales. II est donc devenu essentiel de reconnaitre I6galement leur r6le
et de formuler des m6canismes pratiques de coop6ration pour assurer leur
participation. L'auteur conclut que l'incorporation de ces concepts juridiques
d6montre la maturit6 grandissante du droit international de I'environnement.

Introduction
International environmental law is a subject that bears a heavy responsibility. It carries the hopes and expectations of international society for its
future generations. I also find the sheer scale of global environmental
problems can be overwhelming. International law is struggling to cope
with what Eric Hobsbawm described as the defining characteristic of the
end of the twentieth century-the trend toward globalization and the
inability of individuals and their public institutions to cope with this
trend.
We now know that international society is more than a collection of
sovereign states. We know that states do not possess the sum of real world
power capable of solving global environmental problems. We know also
that governments do not control the flow of natural resources or money.
We sense that new international means are necessary and evolving. What
follows is a brief examination of the emerging legal bases underlying
developments in international environmental protection as policy-makers, bureaucrats, scientists and lawyers work to understand and manage
this modern world system. I shall consider the principles of precaution
and integration and the roles of non-state actors.

I.

Precaution

1. Introduction
"Ifin doubt, don'tpump it out!" "Better safe than sorry."
"Giving the environment the benefit of the doubt."
These sayings convey the essence of precaution. From the perspective of
decision-makers, they also express a sense of the search for an environmental policy instrument to take the pressure off the planet's life support
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systems, to remove stress from our ecosystems and to allow them the time
to repair themselves.
Where there is a proven risk of environmental harm, a regulatory
action is preventive. When scientific uncertainty is present, the same
action is called precautionary. During the 1980s the precautionary
approach began to appear as a guiding principle in international environmental law. Although its formulation varies from instrument to instrument, this principle generally consists of three main elements, which have
been captured thus:
Where there is a non-negligible risk of serious or irreversible harm to the
environment, regulatory inaction is unjustifiable, even where there is no
certainty that the activity giving rise to the risk actually causes the foreseen
harm.'
The legal status of this principle of law is evolving, but, as will be
shown, there is sufficient evidence of state practice to support a claim that
the precautionary principle has emerged as a part of customary international law.
2. Sources of InternationalLaw
According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, traditional sources of international law are treaties, international
custom, principles of international law and writings ofjurists. Further, the
International Law Commission has proposed that binding decisions of
international organizations and judgments of international courts or
tribunals should constitute additional sources of international law. 2 It is
the role of custom, however, and in particular the interplay between treaty
law and customary obligation, which is of primary concern when evaluating the legal status of the precautionary principle.
Developing rules of customary law is not a formal legislative process
but derives from evidence of consistent state practice and opinio juris.3
State practice is the actual conduct of states which indicates a repeated
application of a particular custom. Such conduct may include the ratification of treaties, participation in treaty negotiations, national legislation,
national court decisions and governmental policy statements. Opinio
juris is evidence that a state's action was motivated by a conviction its

1. J. Cameron & W. Wade-Gery, "Addressing Uncertainty: Law, Policy and the Precautionary Principle" in B. Dente, Environmental Policy in Search of New Instruments (Norwell MA:
Kluwer Academic Pubs., 1995) chap. 6.
2. As cited in P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 1: Frameworks,
Standards and Implementation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) at 103.
3. Ibid. at 118.
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conduct was required by law. Thus, if a state does not persistently object
to a practice of other states, binding obligations may be created based on
the evidence of that practice. For example, the decision in the Trail
Smelter Arbitration,4 to impose liability for environmental harm between
states, later developed from this incidence of state practice between
Canada and the United States into the well known customary rule which
was articulated in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,5 and which
has been incorporated into numerous treaties.
3. Precautionas Customary Law
The precautionary principle has been endorsed in one form or another by
national legal systems. In Germany, for example, implementation has
centred on basic research, liability schemes, investment incentives and
economic measures, while in the United Kingdom the principle is applied
to governmental action enabling a reduction in pollution through regulation.
It is on the international level, however, that the precautionary principle has gained most recent prominence. Precautionary language has
appeared in almost every recently adopted multilateral and regional
environmental convention and declaration, particularly in relation to the
protection of the marine environment. 6 For example, Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration, prepared at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), provides:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.7

Likewise, the Convention on Biodiversity' and the Climate Change
Convention, 9 both documents resulting from hard negotiations between
states with diverse interests, incorporate the precautionary principle as a
vital means for meeting the threats of irreversible environmental damage.
There is not, however, a uniform understanding of the precautionary
principle among members of the international community. The level of
scientific certainty required to postpone preventive measures is unclear.
4. (U.S. v. Canada) (1931-1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905.
5. Stockholm Declarationon the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/
14/Rev.I (1973), 11 I.L.M. 1416.
6. Supra note 2 at 209.
7. Rio Declarationon EnvironmentandDevelopment, 14 June 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/
5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874.
8. Convention on Biological Diversity, 9 May 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7INC.5/4
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 822, art. 3.
9. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, U.N. Doc. A/
A.C.237/18 (Part 1)/Add. I and Corr. I (1992), 31 I.L.M. 851.
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The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (the 1992 OSPAR Convention), 0 for example,
requires preventive action to be taken "when there are reasonable grounds
for concern."" How does this compare with the "serious or irreparable
damage" threshold expressed in the Rio Declaration? Clearly, there has
to be a non-negligible threat of harm, though one interpretation of the
principle supports merely a shift of the burden of proof from the party
opposing the polluting activity, where it traditionally lies, to the polluter.
This interpretation has found some support in state practice. Under the
1992 OSPAR Convention parties wishing to dump low and intermediate
radioactive waste at sea must first demonstrate scientifically that no
serious environmental harm will result.
Further evidence of the status of the precautionary principle as customary international law is provided by recent judicial decisions favouring
the principle. In cases in Australia and the United Kingdom, 12 the courts
have accepted the existence of the principle. More significant, however,
is the incorporation of the principle as a legal obligation by international
organizations. For example, the Maastricht Treaty amongst the member
countries of the European Community declares:
Community policy on the environment.. . shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source
and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies. 3
In light of this agreement, the Commission has the legal authority to issue
Regulations and Directives based on the precautionary principle and
member states must implement the results as national law.
Similarly, the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 4 has adopted a resolution incorporating the precautionary principle in explicit language in the listing
procedure for species either threatened with extinction, or potentially
threatened with extinction. 5 This resolution is doubly remarkable in that

10. (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1069.
11. Ibid. art. 2(a).
12. Leatch v. National Park and Wildlife Service (1993), 81 L.G.E.R.A. 270 and R. v.
Secretaryof Statefor Trade andIndustry, Exparte Duddridge andOthers, [ 1995] 3 C.M.L.R.
231 (C.A.) respectively.
13. Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, O.J. (1992) No C191/1, art. G(38), 31
I.L.M. 247 at 285 (new Art. 130r(2) of the 1957 EEC Treaty).
14. Convention on InternationalTrade in EndangeredSpecies of Wild Fauna andFlora,2
March 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
15. See CITES Res. Conf. 9.17, respecting Appendices Iand II.
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it not only shifts the burden of proof to the party supporting the downlisting
of the species, but it also establishes a specific precautionary mechanism
for downlisting. Indeed, this result may perhaps signal a new trend toward
a clear definition of precautionary thresholds. Most recently, at the
United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the new convention concluded there 6 requires states to
apply a "precautionary approach" in accordance with detailed implementation procedures, including specific guidelines set out in a separate
annex.17 Here is further evidence that the precautionary principle has
evolved beyond a mere term of art.
4. Conclusion
Implementation of the precautionary principle through national legislation, ratification of treaties, endorsement and promulgation by international organizations as well as national judicial decisions provides
evidence of sufficient state practice to assert that the principle has attained
the status of customary international law. Indeed, in the International
Court of Justice, arguments based on the obligatory nature of the
precautionary approach have recently been made by New Zealand in the
Nuclear Tests Case against France, in which the concept was characterized as "an operative principle of international law."' 8 The argument was
also made by Hungary in the Gabcikova Dam Case against Slovakia. 9
That specific procedures are being designed in various contexts for
establishing precautionary thresholds is perhaps the final evidence that
precaution is becoming an operative policy for environmental protection.
Yet the precautionary principle remains controversial. This is because
it makes a difference. If it did not, vested interests in the status quo would
not expend time and money challenging it. At this stage, there is a wide
consensus in favour of a precautionary approach to environmental
management, 20 at the same time trepidation about its application to
particular problems persists. The fear of going beyond principle to
practice is understandable. We need to work on designing precautionary
procedures which are flexible enough to cope with uncertainty and
16. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 8 September 1995, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.164/37 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1547.
17. Ibid., arts. 5(c), 6 and Annex II.
18. See transcript of N.Z. argument.
19. See P. Sands, R. Tarasofsky & M. Weiss, eds., Documents inInternationalEnvironmentalLaw Vol. IIA (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) at 696-97.
20. On this the International Chamber of Commerce agrees with Greenpeace.
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competing interests, but not so relativistic that the community is incapable of saying "No, that you cannot do." The principle needs to be
harnessed to positive proposals for change, so as to provide, for example,
a lever for inducing technological innovation in the search for clean
production techniques.
II.

Integration

1. Introduction
Another emerging trend in environmental protection is to incorporate
ecological principles into policy making. Recent problem solving methods take a holistic approach by recognizing the inherent interdependence
of natural and social systems, rather than focusing on individual problem
areas or pollutants. On the technical side, this new approach, known as
integrated pollution prevention and control, seeks to minimize environmental degradation by focusing on production processes. On the policy
side, the goal is to integrate environmental and developmental decision
making at the outset of problem solving.
2. IntegratedPollution Control
The traditional approach to environmental regulation has been to focus
pollution control efforts on particular activities or media. This sector
specific approach, however, has proved an ineffective and inefficient
means for protecting the environment since pollution may be easily
shifted from one medium to another. As a result, new policy directives are
emerging which attempt to integrate pollution prevention and control by
focusing on the production processes themselves. For example, in the
United Kingdom, the Environmental Protection Act of 1990 sets out a
system of Integrated Pollution Control, which is "exercisable for the
purpose of preventing or minimising pollution of the environment due to
the release of substances into any environmental medium." 2 Enforced
centrally, this approach replaces a Best Practicable Means test with a
more strict Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost
(BATNEEC) test that is applied immediately to all new or substantially
changed manufacturing processes.
Likewise, a 1991 Council Recommendation of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development calls for states to take into
account "the effects of activities and substances on the environment as a

21.

(U.K.), 1990, c. 43, s. 4(2).
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whole and the whole commercial and environmental life cycles of
substances when assessing the risks they pose and when developing and
implementing controls to limit their release." 2 An Appendix on Guidance attached to the Recommendation identifies five elements of an
integrated approach: "cradle-to-grave" model; anticipation of environmental impacts in all media; waste minimization; common means of
environmental assessment; and complementary use of effects and source
oriented measures. To accomplish these ends, the Recommendation
proposes new institutional, management and technical approaches which
focus on system integration and state cooperation.
The European Community has also recognized the need for an integrated pollution control policy. In 1993 the European Commission issued
a draft directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control which
calls for member states to implement programs to prevent pollution at
source, though individual member states would be responsible for setting
specific pollution emission limits.23 As for implementation, each industrial plant would have to apply to the appropriate competent authority for
authorization to operate. Actual emission limit values would be referenced to a Best Available Techniques test which, as with the BATNEEC
test of the United Kingdom, includes a reference to technical and
economic feasibility.2 4 Thus, as the foregoing examples indicate, a more
holistic approach to environmental protection is being proposed and
implemented at various governmental levels with an emphasis on evaluating actual production processes.
3. Integrationof Environment and Development
A corollary to the precautionary principle is the principle of sustainable
development, since "[b]oth principles emphasize foresight and the need
for proaction rather than reaction."25 One important element of sustainable development is the notion that environmental concerns must be
integrated into economic and other developmental decision making.
Integration of the environment and development is not, however, a new
policy. Principle 13 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration called on states
"to adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their developmental

22. OECD Council Recommendation on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, OECD
Doc. C(90)164/FINAL (1991), para. l(a), in P. Sands, Documents, supra note 19, vol. HIB, at
1198.
23. COM (93) 423.
24. Ibid. art. 2(10).
25. J. Cameron, "The GATT and the Environment" in P. Sands, ed., Greening International
Law (New York: New Press, 1994) 100 at 117.
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planning so as to ensure that their development is compatible with the
need to protect and improye the human environment."26 Nonetheless,
integration was slow to occur, since traditional institutional structures
isolated economic and developmental activities from environmental
activities.

In the late 1980s, however, the international community began to
recognize the need to adopt new policy approaches to slow the pace of
environmental degradation. Structural changes were instituted, signalling the emergence of an integrated approach.27 Notable examples include the incorporation of a title on the environment into European
Community law by amendment of the 1957 EEC Treaty,28 the foundation
of an Environmental Department at the World Bank, and the convergence
of trade and the environment in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).
A more explicit endorsement of the integrated approach was spelled
out in the amendments to the EEC Treaty introduced by the Maastricht
Treaty,29 which require Member States to include environmental considerations in all Community policy decisions. Such a major policy shift is,
however, much more easily said than done. Critical to the success of these
efforts are the collection and dissemination of environmental information, including the conduct of environmental impact assessments. In 1993
the Council of the European Community adopted a resolution to implement a strategy on sustainable development within Community policy.3"
Though this resolution seems to indicate that the integration of environmental and developmental policy is moving forward, given the Community-wide economic and trade interests at stake, immediate achievement
of this goal seems unlikely.
Despite the potential for mutual supportiveness, international environmental and trade policy are divergent in many respects. There is no
parallel policy commitment to integrate environmental concerns into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The preamble to the WTO constituent
instrument3" works protection of the environment into the objectives of
trade liberalisation, but experience to date suggests that the fundamental
obligations of WTO membership--adherence to most favoured nation

26. Supra note 5.
27. Supra note 2 at 206.
28. EC, Single EuropeanAct, O.J. Legislation (1987) No L109/1, 25 I.L.M. 506, art. 25.
29. Supra note 13.
30. O.J. Information (1993) No C138.
31. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round), Agreement Establishing
the Multilateral Trade Organization, Doc. MTN/FA, Part 11 (1993), 33 I.L.M. 13.
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disciplines, non-discrimination and national treatment-have been interpreted as narrowly and as strictly as ever.
A symbolic divergence, which is of everyday practical concern to
traders, lies in the "like products" debate. GATT rules require that
members apply uniform (no less favourable than their own producers)
32
treatment to like products regardless of production and process methods.
Environmental policy makers are concerned with distinguishing, and
even discriminating, between the method of producing products on
environmental grounds. To the trade policy experts, for example, tuna is
tuna: how it is caught is irrelevant. Likewise, oil is oil and how it is refined
is not the business of the importing nation, despite the fact that it is
consumed in that country, releases emissions and is therefore a contributor to a global, as much as a domestic, environmental problem. However,
the environmentalist who urges discrimination in production methods
must contemplate the complexity of reviewing exporters' production
processes, the intrusiveness of such a task, the fact that usually only the
strongest can demand it, and the fundamental fairness of nondiscrimination.
The challenge to environmental policy makers is immense. They may
frequently find themselves caught between the pincers of a domestic
lobby to lower environmental standards, and an external lobby to remove
potential barriers to trade caused by environmental standards. Life
becomes very difficult when domestic legislators buy off the local lobby
with an exception to environmental standards which they do not make
available to non-voting exporters, and therefore discriminate unlawfully.
It may become necessary to return to international negotiations or to
lower standards generally to remove the grounds for a challenge. In some
key sectors such as energy, the temptation to orchestrate a campaign
based on this scenario has probably not been resisted.
Until GATT rules actually support the worldwide integration of
development and environmental policies, the WTO will run counter to
the principles agreed to by the states present at UNCED. There, in very
explicit language, the separate policy objectives of environmental protection and development were bound together. Though not mandatory,
Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration provides:
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it.33

32.
33.

GAIT 4 BISD (1969), 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. 111(2).
Supra note 7.
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Trade liberalisation is an enterprise designed to deliver global economic
development more rapidly and more securely than any other economic
policy instrument or process. The trend towards globalization depends
upon it. But the system that drives this enterprise must not ignore the
effects on the environment which sustains all life. Ultimately the participants in the system, whether governments, corporations or non-governmental organizations, must be bold about declaring where development
priorities lie. If trade liberalisation does not aim to achieve sustainable
development but proceeds as an end in itself, then its tremendous energy
is likely to be applied destructively. Environmental values are at risk;
however, they need not be.
4. Conclusion
With new regulation favouring an holistic, over a single sector, approach,
as well as legal principles integrating development and the environment,
environmental policy is on a more efficient and effective course. The
Committee on Trade and Environment of the WTO is expected to report
its views on these matters to the first Ministerial Conference of the
members of the WTO in December 1996 in Singapore. The Committee
may find ways to support multilateral environmental agreements by
removing the threat of challenge in the WTO. It may create rules which
would sanction and yet guide the development of eco-labelling schemes.
It may make the connection between access to the markets of the North
for the South, and concerns in the South about the effect on biological
resources which the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights regime might have. We will have to wait and
see. What the Committee must demonstrate in Singapore is that the trade
liberalisation system can support global efforts to protect the environment and achieve sustainable development. The surest way to achieve
this end would be to amend the WTO treaty. I suggest that GATT Article
XX should be amended to refer expressly to the environment by the
addition34 of an interpretative understanding. It would provide an explicit
exception for multilateral environmental agreements,35 defined by their
transnational environmental objectives, and concluded under the auspices of an intergovernmental organization with an interest in the
environment.

34. Probably to subparagraph (b), but perhaps a new subparagraph (k).
35. Subject to international law.
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III.

Non-State Actors

1. Introduction
Except in the area of human rights law, public international law does not
recognize non-state actors. In the field of international environmental
law, the traditional means for non-state actors to affect international
outcomes was through political influence or by recourse to judicial
procedures for implementation and enforcement at the national level.
Recent advances in international environmental law indicate, however,
that non-state actors now have greater opportunities for participation in
international fora and, in limited situations, have actually been endowed
with de jure rights. 36 As will be discussed, this change derives from the
recognition that global environmental, problems can only be solved
through broadly based cooperation among state and non-state actors.
2. Non-state Actors
Important non-state actors are environmental, scientific, legal, academic
and corporate organizations, as well as individuals. The involvement of
non-state actors, and particularly non-governmental organizations (NGO),
in multilateral fora is not new. In 1945 the United Nations formalised
NGO participation by granting consultative status, though voting rights
were withheld.3 7 In recent years, however, as the global nature of
environmental degradation has become more evident, the involvement of
NGOs in multilateral institutions has increased, though there has been
little change in their legal status.
On the contrary, multilateral institutions remain organizations of
states, a fact which does not coexist well with recent shifts in functional
arrangements that allow NGOs active involvement in the creation of new
international law. As will be briefly examined below, NGOs representing
diverse interests now routinely participate in multilateral discussions,
circulate documents and address delegates. Such arrangements, though
perhaps inevitable due to the ever increasing need for wide ranging
expertise in the solution of environmental problems, represent a clear
challenge to fundamental, or perhaps fundamentalist, notions of state
sovereignty.

36. Supra note 2 at 158.
37. See UN Charter art. 71 and UN Secretary General, Report on the GeneralReview of
Arrangementsfor Consultationswith Non-GovernmentalOrganisations,UN Doc. E/AC.70/
1994/5(1994).
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3.

State Sovereignty

State sovereignty is, it is said, the cornerstone of international law. A
community of equal states exercising equal rights with associated duties
is the legal model underlying all international institutions and instruments. 38 The increasing influence of non-state actors on international law
making poses difficulties for the doctrine of state sovereignty, as issues
of representation and accountability arise. Currently, there is no review
mechanism whereby non-state actors are held accountable when and
where they exercise power. A major challenge facing international
environmental law is to find a way to maintain a superstructure of states,
while at the same time effectively channelling the political will and
expertise of non-state power holders and participants.
4. Evolving Role of Non-state Actors
Major international functions of NGOs include information collection,
analysis and exchange; identification of issues; participation as observers
in international organizations and treaty negotiations; and the informal
monitoring of compliance with convention provisions. Instances of NGO
participation in specific conventions are too numerous to list. The
following examples demonstrate the current trends in the evolution of
NGO participation.
In CITES,3 9 NGOs played an important participating role, including
calling for the convention in the first place. Once CITES was adopted,
NGOs were actively involved in monitoring compliance with its provisions and later used their observer status to affect specific listings and
listing criteria for endangered species. CITES is perhaps most notable as
an early example of NGO participation expressly being written into an
inter-state convention, the text allowing for any qualified non-state actor
to have the right to participate but not vote.41 More recently, similar
language was incorporated into the Montreal Protocol,4 the Climate
43
Change Convention 42 and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The greatest shift in the participation of non-state actors in international fora is widely recognised as having occurred at UNCED. From the
initial preparations through the final negotiations, the UNCED process

38. Supra note 2 at 15.
39. Supra note 14.
40. Supra note 14, art. 11(6) and (7).
41. Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541, art. 11(5).
42. Supra note 9, art. 7(6).
43. Supra note 8, art. 23(5).
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relied extensively on non-state actors. Indeed, they were often quite close
to the heart of decision making. It has been observed that:
At the preparatory sessions for UNCED, NGOs worked alongside the
government delegations to prepare reports, to find issues, provide data and
advocate positions. This expanded NGO role is forcing a new examination
of the traditional state decision-making process and is4 stretching the
boundaries of the United Nations negotiation structures.
Not surprisingly, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 both affirm this
expanded role for nonstate actors. Agenda 21 declares:
The organizations of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental organizations will need to provide increased financial and administrative support fornongovernmental organizations and their self-organised
networks, in particular those based in developing countries, contributing
to the monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 21 programmes, and provide
training for non-governmental organizations.., to enhance their partnership role in programme design and implementation."
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration" recognises the procedural rights for
all individuals in asserting:
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by
making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Clearly, after UNCED, the involvement of non-state actors in international environmental problem solving have received a significant political boost as well as legal and institutional backing, though theoretical and
practical difficulties related to the traditional role of the state remain.
Perhaps the institution which has provided the best illustration of the
evolution of ideas about the appropriate level and form of non-state actor
involvement has been the Global Environment Facility (GEF). During its
pilot phase, GEF had few formal rules governing NGO participation, and
as a result, NGOs contributed at all levels of policy discussion. Once an
administrative structure was in place, however, NGO participation was
formalised. Prior to participant meetings, NGOs were given access to
documentation under consideration and invited for one to two day
consultative meetings, for which travel grants were made available for
some organizations from developing countries. Later, after a restructuring of the GEF, there was intense debate on whether or not NGOs should

44. N. Lindborg, "Future Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Environmental Negotiations" in Susskind, Dolin & Breslin, eds., InternationalEnvironmental
Treaty Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Program on Negotiations at Harvard Law School, 1992)
1 at 2.
45. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992) chap. 27.12.
46. Supra note 7.
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observe GEF Council meetings, and it was decided that five NGOs would
attend the meeting and five would view the proceedings on closed circuit
television. Further discussion on NGO involvement is currently taking
place while the Council considers how to develop criteria for the selection
of NGO representatives based on such factors as regional representation,
technical expertise and self-selection procedures.
The GEF example points to the main institutional issues at the heart of
the debate on non-state actor participation. Current Council proposals
are, in fact, rather innovative in the way they suggest a legal structure of
rules for allowing NGO involvement that addresses sovereignty objectives. Major features of these proposals include the self-selection by
NGOs of their representatives, subject to approval by the Council.
Further, the Council will develop criteria for NGO accreditation based on
broad based geographic distribution, technical expertise, and a balance
between international, national and local representation. Clearly, the
Council is suggesting a new political structure based on networks and
constituencies outside the domain of states.
As a final example, at a recent meeting of a consensus building
initiative focused on trade and development, 47 I provided a modest
proposal outlining possible procedural rules for NGO participation at the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition to the principles of
selfselection, equitable geographic distribution and expertise considered
by the GEF, with which I agree, I offered other suggestions specific to the
WTO:
1. Access to information is essential for building trust, ensuring credibility and in building the conditions for accountability. There should
be a presumption in favour of open access to information, including
all Secretariat documents and official decisions, with a set of rules
explaining clearly when that presumption may be overturned. There
should be no presumption of openness for negotiation documents.
2. A distinction must be made between the various forms of participation which might be available to non-state actors. There is a clear
distinction between negotiating and discussing policy. For instance,
a clear distinction exists between negotiating trade concessions and
discussing the compatibility of multilateral environmental agreements and trade rules, which may or may not lead to negotiating

47. Consensus Building Institute, Trade and Environment Policy Dialogue. The policy
dialogue is a private initiative to bring together environment and trade experts, diplomats,
negotiators and opinion formers to find ways of better understanding the relationship between
trade and environmental policy and specifically to feed creative solutions into the Committee
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processes later on. NGOs may not be present in trade negotiations,
though they may be called upon for consultation by agreement if a
state has asked an expert not in government employ to join its
delegation and advise.
NGOs may speak at the beginning and end of meetings through their
selected representatives, and whenever a state asks the chair of the
meeting to give them the floor owing to their expertise. The chair
(following GEF principles) may still refuse the floor.
The WTO Secretariat is often requested to produce documents for
members states. These documents should be peer reviewed for
outside opinion. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change follows this procedure to good effect for both science
and policy response documents.
A Secretariat-NGO liaison office should be established to facilitate
cooperation.
One model for NGO representation could consist of three NGOs
chosen by their peers representing environmental, development and
business interests in that order. A separate room with a television
monitor should also be made available for other interested NGOs.
Confidentiality concerning matters of non-environmental concern
between states must be strictly respected. This principle should be
fundamental to any model of participation that may be developed.

The culture of the WTO and its members, which are ironically the same
states that have supported the involvement of NGOs in environmental
fora, are unreceptive, to put it politely, to these ideas. There may be some
movement on access to information. In future, more documents previously restricted may be made available more quickly. The WTO now has
a website! But no NGOs may observe meetings, let alone participate.
UNEP may attend as an observer but cannot speak to the Committee on
Trade and Environment except through the agency of a government
representative. It is argued that the place for NGO lobbying (it is assumed
by the WTO and it's members that all NGOs are lobbyists-no thought
is given to independent non-governmental experts, for example) is within
the national political system and not at the international level, because it
would be unmanageable. It is said that the institution will be overrun with
mad French farmers! This posturing is woefully out of step with developments in international society as is evidenced by the other multilateral
agreements referred to previously. If it marks a trend back towards a
reactionary expression of state sovereignty, it will do damage to the very
spirit of multilateralism on which the WTO is built.
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5. Conclusion
That states have come to use, and even depend upon, the expertise of
NGOs in developing international environmental policy is not surprising.
Given the scale and complexity of environmental problems, finding
adequate and equitable solutions which address the diversity of geographic and economic interests is a formidable task, and states do not
possess the sum of real world power necessary to meet this challenge.
Moreover, the extraction and movement of natural resources, activities
which are increasingly seen to impact all the world's populations, should
be monitored at some supranational level. As a result, non-state actors
have begun not only to assume a fiduciary role in the interests of the
environment on behalf of international society, but also to save states
much time and expertise gathering information and monitoring conditions.
A significant challenge remains, however, to develop a workable
mechanism for non-state actor participation in environmental protection
which best represents the interests at stake in each forum. Choosing
among non-state actors willing to participate, and developing a method
which fairly incorporates the vital interests of both state and not-state
actors is critical to future success. It is time formally to recognize that nonstate actors play an indispensable role in international environmental law
making.
Conclusion
Although most early developments in international environmental law
were reactive to specific incidents or new scientific evidence, recent
advances in the field have begun to reflect a measure of maturity as
underlying policy objectives increasingly embrace more comprehensive
methods. Specifically, environmental problem solvers no longer feel
they have the luxury to wait for conclusive scientific evidence of
environmental degradation before designing regulatory programs. They
are building into their decision making systems an element of precaution,
which is gradually emerging as a principle of customary law. Similarly,
environmental media are no longer seen as closed independent systems,
nor are economic and environmental problems viewed as solvable
separately. Here an integrated approach is recognized as crucial to
achieving sustainable development. Finally, the players themselves, the
problem solvers engaging in this evolving enterprise, are no longer
affiliated only with the states of their birth, but represent wider and more
diverse interests than those which attach to citizenship. They need to be
formally incorporated into the decision making process.

